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1 Introduction
Numerous economists have studied the effect of mandatory minimum wages on
wages and employment. Recently, there has been a new round in this discussion,
as a result of evidence generated by natural experiments. The evidence shows that
the effect of observed increases in the minimum wage has been small (see e.g. Card
and Krueger (1994)). Yet there is still little agreement on the effect of minimum
wages on employment. In a way, this is not surprising. To determine the effects,
one must distinguish individuals who are unemployed because of the minimum
wage from individuals who would be unemployed anyway. This distinction is that
between ‘structural’ and ‘frictional’ unemployment.
In this paper we investigate whether the Burdett-Mortensen equilibrium search
model can be used to distinguish between these two types of unemployment, so
that we can obtain an estimate of the fraction of unemployment that can be
attributed to the minimum wage. An interesting feature of this model is that it
has a dispersed wage equilibrium in which the law of one price does not hold.
This is because firms have monopsony power due to search frictions on the labour
market, and, in equilibrium, there is a trade-off between the size of the firm and
the wage paid at the firm. As a consequence, wages need not be equal to marginal
value products and therefore it is possible that there is no effect of the minimum
wage on unemployment. The fact that wage regressions with extensive controls
for productivity characteristics of workers do not have an impressive explanatory
power lends credence to a model that does not impose the law of one price. An
additional advantage of the model is that it allows the shape of the whole equi-
librium wage distribution to be sensitive to changes in the minimum wage. The
latter has been regarded as a stylized fact of the labour  market (see e.g. Kiefer
and Neumann ( 1993)).
In Section 2 we discuss the Burdett-Mortensen model and the extension to
heterogeneous agents. The Burdett-Mortensen model was developed in Burdett
and Mortensen (1989) and Mortensen (1990), and has been discussed in a large
number of papers. Van den Berg and Ridder (1992) p resent an extensive empirical
analysis of this model. Because of th,i,s,  t,,he  .exposition  in Section 2 will be brief.
The data are described in Section 3:Z..These  are based on a survey conducted in
the Netherlands from 1985 onwards., Again, because this survey has been used
in numerous other studies (like Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991),  Van den Berg
(1992),  Van den Berg and Ridder (1992) and Van den Berg and Ridder (1993)),
the exposition in Section 3 will be brief.
The likelihood function is derived in Section 4. Section 5 contains an ex-
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tensive discussion of the identification of the model, and, in particular, of the
different types of unemployment. The estimation results are in Section 6. We
pay particular attention to the fit of the model to the wage data.
2 The Equilibrium Search Model
2.1 Equilibrium Search with Identical Agents
Consider a labour  market with identical agents, i.e. a market in which all workers
are equally productive at all firms. Even in this case, the Burdett-Mortensen
model has a dispersed equilibrium wage (offer) distribution, i.e. the law of one
price does not hold. Allowing for heterogeneity in the productivity of workers
adds to the equilibrium dispersion of wages. The main theoretical contribution
of this paper is the introduction of productivity heterogeneity in this basic model
in such a way that frictional and structural unemployment can be meaningfully
defined.
We assume that there are large fixed numbers of workers and firms partic-
ipating in the labour  market (formally a continuum of each). The measure of
workers is denoted by m, whereas the measure of firms is normalized to one.
Workers receive job offers at given Poisson rates, X, when unemployed and X,
when employed, with 0 5 X,, X,  < co. Job offers are independent random draw-
ings from the distribution F(W) of wage offers. When an offer arrives, the worker
must decide whether to accept the offer or to reject it and continue searching for
a better one. Workers become unemployed at the exogenous separation rate 6
(0 < 6 < oo).  During unemployment, the worker receives unemployment benefits
b  (0 < b  < 00).  A firms posts a wage that is the same for all workers, and it does
not bargain over this wage. In the basic model, the value product of any worker
at any firm is the same. It is denoted by p. The firms have a linear production
function, so that the average and marginal product are equal. Individuals and
firms are assumed to maximize their expected wealth.
Assuming that the wage offer distribution is known and stationary over time
and that wages are constant in jobs, the supply-side of this model is equivalent
to the standard job search model with search on the job (see e.g. Mortensen
(1986)). Thus, the optimal strategy of an unemployed worker has the reservation
wage property. The reservation wage r is
r=b+(X,-A,)  O”J
&w)
T s + A,E(w)dW
2
(24
.,, _.,
with F = 1 - F.  Employed workers accept any wage offer that exceeds their
current wage.
It is important to distinguish between the distribution of wages offered to
individuals, which is the wage o$er  distribution F, and the distribution of wages
received by workers who are currently employed. The latter is referred to as
the earnings distribzltion,  and we denote this distribution by G. In equilibrium,
the flow of workers out of jobs with a given wage is equal to the inflow in such
jobs. Similarly, the flows into and out of unemployment are equal. Firms that
offer a wage lower than the reservation wage of the unemployed do not attract
any worker and therefore cannot survive. The market is only viable if there is a
positive gain from trade, i.e. if p > b. Under these assumptions we have
~fY4
G(w) = s + X,F(w)
F(r) = 0
U s
-=-
m 6 + A,
w>r P-2)
(24
In (2.4), u is the number of unemployed workers. Thus, u/m is the rate of
frictional unemployment in this market. It is determined by the rates 6 and
X,. Note that with full information on the location of jobs, i.e. in the absence
of search frictions, X, = 00 and u = 0. Frictional unemployment should be
distinguished from structural unemployment, which occurs if the unemployment
benefits, or more generally the value of leisure, exceeds the value product p. This
type of structural unemployment is voluntary, because workers are better off if
they are unemployed. The model implies that the re-employment hazard does
not depend on b. An increase in b  increases r, but this only shifts the wage
offer distribution. All wage offers remain acceptable to the unemployed. This is
consistent with the findings of empirical studies of unemployment durations with
Dutch and US data (see the surveys in Van den Berg (1990b)  and Devine and
Kiefer (1991)). Only if b exceeds p then the re-employment hazard falls to 0, and
unemployment rises.
If there is a mandatory minimum wage, denoted by wL,  then wage offers
must exceed this wage. If p < wL,  then firms do not employ any worker, and
there is structural unemployment. This type of unemployment is involuntary if
b < p < wL,  because workers would supply labour  if the minimum wage would
be lower than p. Hence, if p > max(wL, b) then there is frictional unemployment
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equal to u, while if the reverse holds there is voluntary or involuntary structural
unemployment equal to m.
For the moment, assume that p > max(wL,  b). The steady-state level of
production is determined by the size of the steady-state work force Z of the firm.
That work force depends on the wage w set by the firm, the reservation wage r
of the unemployed, and the distribution F of wages set by other firms competing
for the same workers. Each firm chooses w to maximize its steady-state profit
flow 7r,  which, given T and F,  equals (p -  w)Z(w;  T,  F).
A non-cooperative steady-state equilibrium solution consists of a reservation
wage T and a wage offer distribution F such that (i)  r satisfies (2.1) given F,
and (ii)  every w in the support of F maximizes the steady-state profit flow 7r.
Burdett and Mortensen (1989) prove that there is a unique equilibrium and they
give closed-form solutions. The distributions F and G have probability density
functions f and g with a support equal to [w,  ZU],  with
u, = max(wL,  r) P-5)
w = [&]*E+  [I- [&]*]P
The equilibrium wage offer c.d.f. and p.d.f. are
Substitution of (2.6) in (2.1) gives
r = (6 + Q2b + &I - WlP
(6 + u* + &I - Wl i f  r>wL.
(2.6)
(2.7)
(2.8)
If r > wL,  the equilibrium reservation wage is not given by (2.8). However in
that case the reservation wage is not effective, because the lowest wage offer is
wL.  If T 2 wL  then T and W are weighted averages of b  and p. Otherwise w is
a weighted average of p and wL. Note that r is smaller than b iff X, is smaller
than Xi. In that case the unemployed accept a wage lower than b, because it
is easier to find a higher paying job if employed. Allowing for this possibility is
important given the empirical evidence on the relative size of b and r (see e.g.
Narendranathan and Nickel1 (1985), Van den Berg (1990a)  and Van den Berg
(1990b)).
Using (2.2),  the e ui 1 rium wage (or earnings) density isq ‘1-b
g(w)  =
&/FE 1
2x, (p - wy
o n  [w,  2ij].
Note that both f and g are increasing densities. The wage distribution is
related to the income distribution, and there is abundant empirical evidence that
the income distribution does not have an increasing density. We return to this
issue below. For an employed individual earning a wage w, the exit rate out of
that job equals S + X,&w). This rate decreases in w, which is consistent with a
number of empirical studies on job durations (Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991)
and Van den Berg (1992)).
2.2 Heterogeneity in Value Products
In reality, workers and firms are obviously not identical. All parameters of the
model, i.e. X,,  Xi,  5,  b and p vary over workers and/or firms. As argued in Van
den Berg and Ridder (1992), the r e are basically two ways to introduce heterogene-
ity: within the market and between markets. Heterogeneity within the market
means that there is one labour  market within which heterogeneous workers and
firms interact. Heterogeneity between markets means that the labour  market is
segmented and consists of a large number of separate submarkets within which
workers and firms are homogeneous. We follow the latter approach, and we as-
sume that we observe a mixture of homogeneous markets. Conceivably we can
stratify on all the parameters. In the present context, dispersion in p is par-
ticularly relevant, since it allows for the possibility of structural unemployment
(namely when p < max(wL, b)). Because we assume that p follows a continuous
distribution, we have effectively a continuum of submarkets which differ in the
value product of workers.
As noted above, there is abundant empirical evidence that the income dis-
tribution does not have an increasing density as is predicted by the model with
identical agents. Allowing for heterogeneity in p may improve the fit to the ob-
served wage offer and earnings distribution. To see this we consider the following
transformation of w (note that we acknowledge the dependence of the support of
w on  P)
y= p-w
P  - W(P)
so that the excess wage w - w(p) satisfies
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(2.10)
?JJ  - W(P)  = (1 - Y>(P  - U(P))*
If w is distributed according to F then the density of y is
(2.11)
f,(Y) = l
v - BIY
-l/2
l12SYLl
while if w is distributed according to G then the density of y is
-312
1721Y11 (2.13)
(2.12)
with 77  = S/(S + Xi).
Equation (2.11) describes the wage determination in the Burdett-Mortensen
model. The excess wage w -u)(p) is a fraction of the excess productivity p-g(p).
This fraction is a random variable with a distribution that depends on X,/6,  which
is the expected number of wage offers during a spell of employment (i.e. a spell
that starts with the acceptance of a job from unemployment and ends with a
layoff). This ratio is a measure of the speed at which the worker climbs the job
(and wage) ladder, with y = 1 corresponding to the bottom, w = u)(p),  and
y = q2 to the top, w = W(P), of this ladder. From (2.11) it follows that the
moments of w -u)(p) in either the wage offer or the earnings distribution are the
product of (p - w(p))” and an expression that only depends on 77.  By choosing
an appropriate distribution of the productivity p,  the moments of the observed
wage offer or earnings distribution can be matched. Hence, we expect that an
acceptable fit to the data depends on the allowance for sufficient heterogeneity
in p. This is confirmed in Van den Berg and Ridder (1992).
3 The Data
The model is estimated with the OSA (Netherlands Organization for Strategic
Labour Market Research) Labour Supply Panel Survey. This panel started in
1985. Presently four waves are available (April-May 1985, August-October 1986,
August-October 1988,  and August-November 1990).
In the OSA panel a random sample of households in the Netherlands is fol-
lowed over time. Because the study concentrates on individuals who are between
15 and 61 years of age and who are not full-time students, only households with
at least one person in this category are included. All individuals (and in all
cases the head of the household) in this category are interviewed. The first wave
consists of 4020 individuals (in 2132 households).
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The data allow a reconstruction of the sequence of labour  market states occu-
pied by the respondents and the sojourn times and income levels in these states.
Part of the information is retrospective. For example, the first wave (in 1985) con-
tains information on the labour  market histories from January 1, 1980 until the
date of the interview. The following labour  market positions are distinguished:
employment (job-to-job changes are recorded), self-employment, unemployment,
and not-in-labour-force (subdivided into being in military service, doing full-time
education, and other activities not related to the labour  market).
In this paper we restrict the attention to respondents who were participating
in the panel as of the first wave. Individuals who were self-employed at certain
dates of the time span covered by the survey were deleted, since it is likely that the
behaviour of such individuals, at least in a certain period, deviates substantially
from the behaviour as described by the model. For similar reasons, we do not use
information on respondents who are observed to be nonparticipant in the labour
market at certain dates. Finally, we delete observations for which the reported
wage is smaller than the legal minimum wage.
As a result, we have a sample of 1767 individuals. Of these, 12% were unem-
ployed at the date of the first interview. In our sample, 34% participates in all
four waves of the panel, while 33% only participates in the first wave. The in-
come changes at transitions occurring before the date of the first interview (April
1985) are only recorded to lie in one of a few broad intervals. This makes the
information on spells ending before this date relatively inaccurate in comparison
to spells ending after it, for which we observe exact income levels. Therefore, the
first spell used is the spell which is ongoing at the date of the first interview. For
computational reasons, information on subsequent spells is not used either.
The benefits level b  is taken to be the mean in the sample. From the informa-
tion in the survey, the mandatory minimum wage 20~  can be calculated for each
respondent. In the empirical analysis, we take the sample average.
4 The Likelihood Function
If we only allow for heterogeneity in p, then the parameters of the model are Xc,
X,,  6 and the parameters of the distribution of p. We estimate these parameters
from observed labour  market histories of a sample of individuals. In its simplest
form, the model has no observed explanatory variables, and the dependent vari-
ables are aspects of the individual labour  market histories. To be specific, the
dependent variables are
7
Position at time offirst  interview:
u = 0: unemployed
u = 1: employed
Elapsed and residual duration in position at first interview:
tab  = elapsed unemployment duration
tof = residual unemployment duration
tlb = elapsed job duration
tlf  = residual job duration
Paid and accepted wages:
w,,  = re-employment wage of unemployed individual
wi  = wage of employed individual at time of first interview
First transition if employed at first interview:
v = 0: job-to-unemployment transition
v = 1: job-to-job transition
The model implies a particular distribution for all these variables. For a given
value of p > max(b,  wL),  the employment and job durations are Exponentially
distributed. Following Ridder (1984),  this implies that the elapsed and residual
durations are independent and also Exponentially distributed. If p < b,  there
is no gain from trade, and if p < wL, the minimum wage is too high to employ
the workers. In both cases the workers are permanently unemployed. Hence,
the unconditional unemployment duration t,  in the population has the following
defective distribution, in which Ic  denotes the density for 0 < t,  < 00 and H is
the c.d.f. of p:
k(t,)  = A,exp(-X,t,)H(max(b,wL)) o<t,<oo (4.1)
Pr(t,  =  00)  =  H(max(b,wL))
The unconditional distribution of u is
-
Pr(u  =  0 )  =  -
s,“x  H(
ma@,  WL)>  + H(max(4  q,))
Pr(u  =  1 )  =  1 -  P:(u  =  0 )
P-2)
Conditional on p > max( b,  wL),  the elapsed and residual unemployment durations
are independent and Exponentially distributed with parameter A,.
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The likelihood function involves the joint densities of wa,p and q,p.  In these
densities, w,,  and w1  are only defined if p > max(b,  wL).  Moreover, the distribu-
tions of w,Ip and w1  Ip have a bounded (and identical) support, and the bounds
w and w of the support depend on p (see Section 2). The support of the joint
distribution of wi,p  differs according to the values of b,  wL,  A,  and A,.  It is con-
venient to distinguish the following four regimes:
I. b 5 wL, A,  > A,
III. b > wL, 4 ’ A3
IV. b > wL, A, I &I
Because b and wL  are known and constant within a segment of the labour
market, we know whether the segment is in one of the first two regimes or in
one of the last two regimes. In our sample we always have b 5 wL.  This implies
that permanent unemployment is due to p < wL,  i.e. a high minimum wage,
rather than p < b, i.e. a high level of unemployment benefits. In most cases, our
estimate of A, is larger than A,  (see below), so then regime II applies. In this
regime the bounds on w are
W(P) = WL q&PIP (4.3)-
W(P) = 4P> PIP--=
(44$P> = [&]‘WL + [I-  (&)*]p
if wL  5 p < E ; while
w(p) = (6 + X,)2 :;I,  -  X,)X, b  +
s*
l - (S + A,)* + (A)  -  X,)X,  p1
i f  p<p<co--
with
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@ + u2 (wL - b)
2 = wL + (A, - X,)X, (4.5)
Low-productivity workers with 0 < p < b  are unemployed due to a high value
of non-employment. Low-productivity workers with b  < p < wL  are willing to
work, but the high minimum wage makes firms unwilling to hire them. In markets
with wL  < p < p the lowest wage is equal to the minimum wage, and in markets-
with p > p the lowest wage is equal to the reservation wage which is increasing-
in p.  The equilibrium search model induces a positive correlation between p and
the wage. Note that workers are always paid less than their marginal product.
Let I(.) denote the indicator function of the event between parentheses. The
likelihood for the case of complete information equals
L= O”J [I(P s0 < ma44  d>  + I(P  2 m&x(  4 q,))  -6 + A, Jo  exP(-Xo(tob  + iOf))
s+ A,
I
l - u
x”.2A,(p - to(p))1/2(p  - w)1/2 J&(P)  I w 5 W(P)
1
UP 2 ma@, d).f&.
qp - W(P)>“’ 1
0
2x
1
yp - 43/2
exp
(
-(X1  + 6). (;T-E;;;;;,2  .(Gb  + 4f)
)
(p - wy 1-V
s”* P1+ yp _ w(p))‘,2 - 6 .I(W(P)  5 w 5 W(P)> 1
u
dH(P)
(4.6)
We do not have complete information on all observations due to censoring or
missing data. On the assumption that censoring is uninformative and that data
are missing at random, one can easily modify the likelihood to deal with these
complications.
In the sequel we take a Log normal distribution for p,  with parameters pp and
uz.  Note that a discrete distribution for p with unknown points of support gives
a likelihood function that is discontinuous in the parameters. Of course, one can
choose any other positive (continuous) function. Some guidance on the choice of
H is provided by a comparison of the empirical and fitted distribution of wages
paid and offered. This raises the question of the identification of the parameters
and the distribution of p,  to which we turn next.
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5 Distinguishing between Structural and F’ric-
tional Unemployment
The likelihood function combines two types of data: wage data and duration data.
If there is permanent unemployment, then the distribution of the unemployment
durations is defective. However, if there is also frictional unemployment then one
can estimate the re-employment hazard X,. The job durations are distributed
as a non-scalar mixture of Exponential distributions. The mixing distribution is
that of p truncated at max(b,  wL).  Whether the (truncated) mixing distribution
can be identified from the mixture of Exponentials is an open question. Given the
truncated mixing distribution one can identify X,  and S from the job durations
and the subsequent destination, i.e. the distribution of v.
From (2.11),  (2.12) and (2.13) one can recover the moments of the distribution
of p truncated at max(b,  wL)  from the earnings distribution and the distribution
of accepted wages. In regimes II and III, p - w(p) is a piecewise linear function
of p, and this complicates matters, but in regimes I and IV there is a simple
correspondence between the moments of u, and those of the truncated distribution
of p.
From X, and 6 one can compute the frictional unemployment rate. A com-
parison of this frictional rate with the observed unemployment rate at the time
of the first interview allows us to determine the rate of structural unemployment,
i .e.  H(max(b, wL)).  In the Netherlands there generally holds that wL  2 b. In
that case the structural unemployment rate is H(w~).
Although the structural unemployment rate is identified, the effect of a de-
crease in the minimum wage on that rate is not nonparametrically identified.
This is because the shape of the density h of p between 0 and wL  is not non-
parametrically identified. The effect of a marginal change is equal to the value
h(~~)  of the density of p in the neighbourhood of wL.  To quantify the effect of
a marginal decrease of wL, an additional assumption is needed, like continuity of
h at wL.  Note that we can recover the untruncated h for p > wL.
It is interesting to compare this method with that of Meyer and Wise (1983a,
1983b). They estimate the effect of the minimum wage by fitting a truncated Log
normal distribution to a cross-section of observed wages. It is well-known that
the probability mass below the point of truncation is only identified by making
untestable assumptions on the wage distribution (Flinn and Heckman  (1982)). In
particular, the untruncated wage distribution must be recoverable  from the wage
distribution truncated from below. By embedding the problem in an equilibrium
search model we can, at least in theory, find the probability mass below the
1 1
I  .
truncation point without the need to make such an assumption. II
the probability mass of productivities below the truncation point is
difference between the observed unemployment rate and the estimat
unemployment rate.
In the empirical analysis, we take a parametric Log normal disl
p. The family of Log normal distributions satisfies the recoverabilit
This implies that the size of the probability mass below the point o
(and, indeed, the exact shape of the density below that point) can
from the shape of the density above that point. As a result, the mot
parametric distribution is overidentified in the sense that both the wz
the duration data provide information on the size of the probability :
(i.e., structural unemployment). We return to this issue below.
6 Estimation Results
Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for the whole sample as
sample subsets obtained by stratification on age and education as :
the first interview. We distinguish between four age categories (lt
30-38 and 39-61) and three education categories, labelled  in incl
of education as “edul”,  “edu2” and “edu3”.  One may argue that x
dummies at the first interview are inadmissable as stratification varia
they are not time-invariant personal characteristics. We adopt this
the reason that the mandatory minimum wage is strongly age-depen
the results based on age stratification may be more informative c
wage effects than the results based on education stratification. The
sample sizes for the stratified samples exceed the size of the over-all
the reason that respondents with a wage smaller than UI~  are delett
is taken to be the average over the (sub)sample  at hand.
Table 2 presents the implications of the parameter estimates fo
variables of interest. It is convenient to discuss the contents of both 1
taneously. In almost all cases, X, exceeds X,. As a result, for any va
reservation wage r(p)  generally exceeds the benefits level b. On aT
(which is the mean of r(p)  over p, conditional on p > wL)  exceeds the
minimum wage. All arrival rates are monotonically decreasing in agf
productivity monotonically increases in age. The variables Ef(w)  an
note the expectation over p of the average wage offer given p and the 4
wage given p,  all conditional on p > wL.  These also increase in age.
the difference between E(plp > wL)  and E,(w) is small. This is prim:
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the expected numbers of job offers in employment is quite large, so that most
individuals may move swiftly from a job with a moderate wage to a job with a
wage close to the productivity level. For teenagers, an additional reason is that
wL  is generally close to p, so that the range of wages is strongly affected by the
minimum wage.
On average, frictional and structural unemployment equal 3.4% and 10.2%,
respectively. Thus, unemployment is mainly structural. Frictional unemploy-
ment is largest for teenagers. This is mainly due to the disproportionally large
layoff rate for these individuals. Structural unemployment is also largest for for
teenagers. For this group, the unconditional mean of p is relatively close to wL.
Indeed, most probability mass of p is in the neighbourhood of wL.  It turns out
that for almost 20% of all teenagers their mandatory minimum wage exceeds
their productivity, even though their minimum wages are smaller than those for
older individuals.
The amount of structural unemployment is not a monotone function of age.
The group with the second largest amount of structural unemployment is the
age group 39-61. This may be somewhat surprising in light of the fact that this
group has the highest mean productivities and wages of all age groups. However,
the variance of the productivities for the age group 39-61 is much larger than
the corresponding variance for the other groups. Because of this, the left tail of
the productivity distribution is relatively fat, and almost 10% of the individuals
has p < wL. This age group presumably contains a relatively large number of
individuals whose skills are not in demand anymore, and/or individuals who have
lost their skills, and/or individuals who are disabled.
The estimated model can be used to examine the effect of a 10% increase of
the mandatory minimum wage. It turns out that on average this would increase
structural unemployment from 10.2% to 17.0%. This is substantial, and exceeds
the estimated effects in other Dutch studies like Van Soest (1989),  although it
is only marginally larger than the estimated effect in Van den Berg and Ridder
(1992). The increase of structural unemployment implies that the number of
individuals who are not structurally unemployed decreases, so that with invari-
ant arrival rates A, and S the absolute percentage of frictional unemployment
decreases. However, the latter change is negligible in comparison to the change
in structural unemployment. Note that the estimated model can also be used to
examine the effects of decreases of wL. Given the continuity of the productiv-
ity density, these effects will roughly be symmetrically opposite to the effects of
increases of wL.  Recall h owever from the previous section that such results are
sensitive to an untestable assumption.
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The age group 23-29 has the largest relative and absolute increase in structural
unemployment following a 10% increase in wL. The reasons that these increases
are a bit larger than they are for teenagers are, first of all, that the absolute level
of 20~  is larger than it is for teenagers, so that a 10% increase entails a larger
increase in absolute terms, and secondly that the variance of p is a bit smaller
than it is for teenagers. Before we move on to examine other implications of the
results, it may be worth noting that changing the unemployment benefits level
b (within reasonable bounds) does not affect unemployment at all. As note&+
Section 2, this is in accordance to the previous empirical research based on Dutch
data.
Table 3 presents decompositions of the total variation in wage offers (i.e.
decompositions of the variance of wage offers over the whole population). The
variation due to frictions is defined as the mean over p (and over the stratification
variables) of the variation in wage offers conditional on p. This variation stems
from the fact that wage offers are dispersed in the homogeneous model.
It turns out that most wage offer variation is due to productivity variation.
Note that most of the variation due to the stratification variables can also be
attributed to productivity variation. The improvement in the fit that is obtained
by stratifying the data partly reflects the inadequacy of the Log normal distribu-
tion as a description of the productivity heterogeneity distribution over the whole
population. In any case, from an empirical point of view it is clear that the wage
offer variation due to search frictions is not extremely important. This is even
more true for the variation in paid wages, since in the homogeneous model these
are less dispersed that wage offers.
Now let us compare the estimated total unemployment rates to those in the
data at the first interview. Except for individuals with low education, the ob-
served rates are over-estimated. However, the size of the difference is generally
small. For example, the over-all unemployment estimate is 13.5%,  whereas at the
first interview 11.8% of the respondents was unemployed. Nevertheless, it may
be interesting to examine this more closely, since this is a parameter of interest.
Assume that the rates X, and 6 are estimated correctly. Then these differences
mean that the fraction of structurally unemployed individuals in the data is a
bit smaller than it is according to the estimated model. Now recall the remarks
in the previous section on the overidentification of the model with Log normally
distributed p. Basically, here both the wage data and the duration data provide
information on the size of structural unemployment. If the model is misspecified
then these pieces of information may seem to be in conflict. Apparently, the
wage data suggest a larger fraction of structurally unemployed individuals than
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the duration data. Now one may think of two explanations for this.
First of all, it may be that the sample is not random in the sense that struc-
turally unemployed individuals are a bit under-represented. This may well be
true. Structurally unemployed individuals will never find a job, so they may
classify themselves as being a nonparticipant when being questioned on their
labour  market state. In that case they are not included in the sample. However,
the state of nonparticipation also includes individuals who are not active on the
. labour  market but would not be structurally unemployed if they would be active.
For example, it includes all mothers who are at home full time, and it includes
individuals who were formally classified as being disabled in an era in which these
classification rules were rather lenient. The data we use do not enable making
a distinction between these different groups of nonparticipants. Therefore we
cannot deal with this any further.
Now consider a second explanation of the phenomenon above. As shown in
the previous section, the information in the wage data on the size of structural
unemployment originates from the fact that the Log normal distribution satisfies
the recoverability condition. This information is therefore crucially dependent
on the Log normality assumption. It may therefore be that the productivity
distribution (over-all as well as per stratum) is misspecified in the sense that in
reality it is not Log normal.
To shed more light on the specification of the productivity distribution, we
examine the fit of the model to the data on wi  (the wage at the first interview of
employed individuals). Note that the distribution of wi  itself is not Log normal,
but instead follows from the joint distribution of wi, p (see Section 4). However,
almost all variation in wi  originates from the variation in p, and there is a positive
correlation between w1  and p. Therefore there is a strong similarity between the
distribution of wi  and the distribution p truncated from below at wL.  More
importantly, we can obtain information on particular types of misspecification of
the distribution of p from the fit of the model to the wi  data.
Figures l-5 present graphs comparing the data on 20~  to the fitted distribution,
for the over-all sample as well as for the subsamples obtained by stratification on
age. In all cases the model is able to explain the fact that the sample distribu-
tion of UI~  is skewed to the right. Also, the left tail of the latter distribution is
explained reasonably well. However, in all cases the model fails to capture the
size of the peak at the mode of the sample distribution. Moreover, the extreme
right-hand tail of the fitted distribution is too thin in comparison to the sample
distribution, whereas in the area between the mode and the extreme right-hand
tail, the fitted density is too high. It seems therefore that the productivity distri-
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Ibution  is not well specified on the interval from the mode up to infinity. Formal
Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests result in rejection for all groups except teenagers.
To what extent this affects the other parameter estimates and the estimated size
of structural unemployment can only be inferred by estimating models with other
distributions for p. This is beyond the scope of the paper.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed and estimated an equilibrium job search model
that allows for a distinction between frictional and structural unemployment.
This model is based on the equilibrium search model as developed by Burdett
and Mortensen. Modelling the distinction is basically established by introducing
heterogeneity in the productivity of individuals over the population. In the ho-
mogeneous search model, unemployment is only frictional, originating from the
fact that people have to wait for some time to find a job. In the heterogeneous
model, individuals are permanently unemployed if their productivity is smaller
than their unemployment benefits or the mandatory minimum wage.
We pay particular attention to the identification of the model. We show
that the model is nonparametrically identified. In contrast to ad hoc models
for minimum wage effects, the magnitude of structural unemployment is well-
identified. This is basically because we exploit the fact that the equilibrium
search model explains both wage data and duration data in terms of the same
deep structural “parameters”. If we parameterize the productivity distribution in
our model then, for certain choices for the family of this distribution, the model
becomes overidentified. This can be exploited to test the specification.
The results show that structural unemployment is empirically more important
than frictional unemployment. Both frictional and structural unemployment are
largest for teenagers. It turns out that for almost 20% of all teenagers their
mandatory minimum wage exceeds their productivity, even though their mini-
mum wages are smaller than those for older individuals. The group with the
second largest amount of structural unemployment is the age group 39-61. The
productivity dispersion within this group is relatively large. This probably re-
flects the fact that there are many older individuals whose skills are not in demand
anymore or who do not have many skills at all.
The distinction between frictional and structural unemployment is particu-
larly relevant for policy analysis. The estimated model can be used to examine
the effect of changes in the mandatory minimum wage on the magnitude of struc-
tural unemployment. It turns out that on average a 10% increase in the minimum
16
wage would increase structural unemployment from 10.2% to 17.0%.
Several topics for further research emerge. The most restrictive aspect of
the theoretical model concerns the assumption that there is only between-market
heterogeneity. It is clear that in reality individuals have the option to move from
low-productivity jobs to high-productivity jobs. A synthesis with the equilibrium-
search model allowing for within-market heterogeneity (see the pivotal paper by
Eckstein and Wolpin (1990)) seems desirable.
On a more modest level, the results indicate that the Log normality assump-
tion for the productivity distribution is too restrictive. Even the models that are
estimated separately for different age and education categories are not able to
explain the right-hand tail of the wage distribution very well. It is not clear to
what extent this affects the estimates of the quantities of interest. Nevertheless, it
may be interesting to estimate models with more flexible families of productivity
distributions.
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Appendix: Estimates, equilibrium implications, variance
decomposition and fitted distributions
Table 1: Parameter estimates for the whole sample, and for subsamples stratified
on age and education. Rates are ner  week. Standard errors in narentheses.
Parameters
all
educ.level 1
educ.level 2
educ.level 3
age 16-22
age 23-29
age 30-38
age 39-61
&I 4 s PP bP N 1ogL
.080 .071
(011 ) (.021
.003
) (.0003
-012
7.82 .33 433 -550
) (018)  (.012)
.127 .156 7.13 .25 196 -1978
(.019)  (085)  (.002)  (.022)  (.015)
.075 .057 .003 7.62 .30 1767 -20697
(.005)  (.Oll)  (.OOOl) (.OOS)  (.005)
.063 .049 .003 7.50 .23 601 -6463
(.OOl) (.016)  (.0002)  (.Oll)  (.006)
.090 .055 .003 7.60 .26 753 -8823
(.013)  (.016)  (.0002)  (.Oll)  (.006)
.121 .067 .007 7.51 .17 449 -5191
(.OlO) (.018)  (.0007)  (.OOl) (.006)
.092 .028 .003 7.67 .27 577 -7138
(011)  (.OlO) (.OOl) (.012)  (.007)
.064 .012 .002 7.72 .34 635 -7032
(007)  (.004)  (.0002)  (015)  (.OlO)
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Table 2: Eq ilibrium Implications; amounts in guilders per month
All 16-22 23-29 30-38 39-61 edul edu2 edu3
b 1192 1177 1189 1219
E(r) 1424
WL
E(P)
WP > WL)
sdevb)
E, (4
E, (4
2137
2241
8 0 7 1120 1248 1320
6 9 6 1432 1922 2242
1000 1450 1450 1450
1295 1852 2219 2393
1395 1903 2289 2518
3 4 0 321 5 9 8 8 4 5
1253 1745 2103 2355
1339 1539 1380
1401 1379 1399 1440
1856 2072 2622
1943 2148 2688
650
1968
2203
4 3 8 5 4 9 878
1751 1927 2256
1915 2115 2632
Frictional unem. 0.034
1366 1863 2234 2461
0.071 0.048 0.033 0.025 0.036 0.030 0.039
Structural unem. 0.102 0.192 0.091 0.070 0.099 0.123 0.084 0.083
Estimated unem. 0.135 0.263 0.140 0.103 0.123 0.159 0.114 0.120
Observed unem. 0.118 0.224 0.111 0.081 0.113 0.181 0.093 0.072
min. wage +10%
Frictional unem.
Structural unem.
0.031
0.170
0.061 0.041 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.027 0.037
0.308 0.218 0.132 0.156 0.226 0.155 0.130
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Table
Model:
due to productivity
due to frictions
due to age
due to education
: Decomposition of variation in wage offers
no stratification stratified on age stratified on educ.level
71% 5 7 % 41%
2 9 % 1 0 % 1 8 %
3 3 %
41%
1,
2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
wclges
Figure 1: Fitted and observed wage earnings distribution for whole sample
2 2
-2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 7 0 0 0
wages
Figure 2: Fitted and observed wage earnings distribution for age 16-22
5 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 7 0 0 0
Figure 3: Fitted and observed wage earnings distribution for age 23-29
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wages
Figure 4: Fitted and observed wage earnings distribution for age 30-38
3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 7 0 0 0
w a g e s
Figure 5: Fitted and observed wage earnings distribution for age 39-61
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